Delivery is key to democatic legitimacy

Delivery and dialogue: key to EU democratic legitimacy

 

Too often, the concept of liberal democracy is reduced to elections. They are only the formal part of democracy; material democracy, the substance, can be quite far away still and various degrees of authoritarianism remain possible. This is shown clearly in so-called ‘illiberal democracy’. Democracy requires translation of the general interest into evidence based, effective policies which deliver broadly desired outcomes. Evidence requires to a broad range of contextual analysis with input from stakeholders and outcomes need to evolve depending on feedbacks and contextual change. In the current European Union, this is difficult because of the non-aligned views and interests of its component parts, an in-built preference for technocratic and stable legalistic governance.

Economic, ecological and (geo-)political developments have led to ever more new objectives being set for the EU. But not enough attention is being paid to delivery and to dialogues with the technocracy during the preparatory phases of policy-making. Failed dialogues lead to failed delivery and undermines trust and legitimacy of governments and of EU institutions alike, leading to a degeneration of democracy. One of the causes of this problem is a dominance of legalistic thinking and a tendency to focus on repartition of competences between the EU and the Member States, and within the EU institutions themselves, leading to silo thinking and behaviour, and to a lack of policy coherence and efficacy.

In order to solve the convergent problems of the EU and to design an appropriate way forward, decision-makers should complement political-legalistic thinking, which suffers from a ‘sovereignty lock-in syndrome’, and which dates from the 1950s (but with roots in the 1930s), with modern systems and management thinking. According to many scholars, even this may not be enough to move the EU into 21st-century governance, but at least it would be a step forward, which can lead to further improvement.

Systems theory explains that one is faced with paradigm shifts when too many anomalies and dysfunctions occur simultaneously in a particular context and when these can no longer be explained within existing thinking frameworks. It then requires an equally radical shift of mind-set and operational modes. (Thomas Kuhn, The structure of scientific revolutions) Management sciences allow for an interdisciplinary approach to problem solving and achieving desired outcomes, by looking at the management ecology and by adapting management to objectives. (Peter Drucker, Management for the 21st century)

Instead of seeking to fit new policies into existing steering models designed for other objectives, the operational models need adaptation to the new policies. Both are required in order to use the system’s leverage points and to push it in the right direction. One cannot build an electric car with the production models of the mechanical one; neither can one develop policies on, for example, migration or climate, with the methods for construction of a common market.

A discussion has been launched now about the reform of the EU, and five possible political scenarios have been proposed; recently, a sixth scenario has emerged, combining elements of the others. They are supposed to lead to another ‘historic declaration’, a speciality of the EU. Whatever may come out, simple continuation with the present governance system, designed for a different time and purpose, is no option to achieve new goals and expectations. But attention to modern governance is hardly present in Brussels discussions.

In order to increase its efficacy of delivery but at the same time improve the balance between technocratic and democratic governance, at a time of a decline in functionalist economic views in favour of more ecological, cultural and social needs and of a generational shift, radical innovation in its public sector should be among the priorities now. Inevitably, innovation is disruptive; if it is not, it is stagnation.

The focus must move towards efficacy of delivery, complementing political-legalistic thinking about competences with modern management methods about delivery and adjusted to a digital age, to new policy objectives and to the current societal culture and expectations. It will give the EU new vigour, credibility and legitimacy.

A change process in established, but no longer up-to-date systems, has two prerequisites: strong leadership and disruptive innovative thinking. The first must be positioned inside the system, but it will only happen if the leadership has proven skills for managing deep change. It is a quality not usually required for Commission Presidents. The second has to come mainly from outside the system, because (internal and external) vested interests nearly always prefer an appearance of change over a game change. The lack of attention, let alone pressure, of EU Member State Governments has been glaring for two decades at least.

Radical innovation may be asking for too much. But system innovation in the European public sector can be done with incremental steps which create a self-propelling change process if – and only if – they are part of a comprehensive ecosystem design and approach. The current reforms (for example the better regulation policy, which in ten years has achieved nothing tangible) are based too much on path-dependent thinking and a hidden desire to change only appearances. The Commission should try again, and a first step could be using new thinking about strategic agility or leadership under complexity to set the direction of a change process; bureaucratic inertia will certainly ensure that one does not come very far and that ecosystem thinking, the basis of 21st century governance, does not pass the intellectual security controls. Still, one or two steps forward is better than the current stalemate.

Regardless of the future scenario chosen for the EU, Member State governments have little choice but to support a real game-changing process, because they will be the ultimate beneficiaries (for example, as with the game-changing Single Market), or the ultimate losers. The EU is de facto a joint venture between states to minimize the costs of their respective economic and social priorities in an increasingly interdependent context. This required a (limited) transfer of legal competences and more efficient allocation of resources, but at the cost of national sovereignty and democracy.

The latter requires new ways of bringing alignment of vision, purpose and implementation; this has received too little attention, in favour of a legalistic view of democracy and its formalistic side: elections. But parliaments are losing importance in all states because of the increased role of the executive; in addition, in a supra-national system it distorts the necessary checks and balances between the Member States. It cannot bring more democratic legitimacy because there is no European ‘polis’, society or nation. Therefore, one must widen thinking about European governance and democracy.

New major challenges have appeared which cannot be solved within the legalistic conceptual frameworks inherited from the 1950s and which still frame the Lisbon Treaty. They are driven by the consequences of monetary integration, the shift to a sustainable economy, the on-going industrial revolution, growing inequality within and between countries, and geo-political developments. The governance system needs to adapt to these in order to deliver the desired outcomes for all citizens.

Innovation requires thinking outside-the-box, away from silos and vested interests, focussing on complex ecosystems which make up modern economies and societies. To do so in public sector systems, one needs to find more inspiration in experiences of countries which have positioned themselves at the top of innovation and competitiveness rankings, and – why not – at the private sector which copes generally better and faster with new contextual conditions. Of course the EU cannot simply copy; only learn from them, with an open mind.

There is no objective reason to ignore in the public sector the matrix management approach of the private, combining horizontal functions, relevant for the overarching strategy (key political objectives) and all product lines, and vertical, line-based functions (sector policies). What about collaborative sharing of responsibilities, joint ventures (internal or external), innovation deals, voluntary agreements, and other models for reaching desired objectives? Innovative, adaptive corporations have dynamic management methods; they are better at avoiding or at rapidly eliminating contradictory arrangements.

There is no objective reason either why a supra-national system of governance cannot look for inspiration at the most performing national systems. A new scenario at the spring 2019 European Council needs to be accompanied by a new system of delivery. This cannot emerge by simply continuing the governance concepts and methods set out in the 1950s for a common market with six countries, or by current superficial changes.

Interacting economic, social and cultural developments have led today to a growing critique of technocratic governance. European public sector innovation should have therefore as twin objectives to improve the quality of democracy and simultaneously to ensure effective governance delivering the desired outcomes.

The EU governance system needs adaptation to a volatile, uncertain, complex, ambiguous new world (VUCA). But its diverse institutional components and the interactions between them face great difficulty in adapting to new paradigms. Useful ideas, promising initiatives and reform attempts get stuck, because the ecology of management is insufficiently taken into account. There is little comparison possible between managing the integration of the factors of production in a common and single market and designing policies for climate change, research and innovation, managing global interdependence, cybersecurity, supporting modernisation of welfare state systems, or a circular economy, to name a few current policy challenges.

To achieve systemic change, the EU should be seen as a cluster of national economic and social ecosystems that must be managed collaboratively instead of hierarchically. Only an ecosystem approach will help to overcome the present silos and EU-Member State antagonism and to bring about continuity, complementarity and coherence between European and national policy-making. A lot can be done without modifying the Treaties.

Setting grand missions is useful but requires cross-disciplinary inputs and cross-sector collaboration of people with core and secondary competences, from different policy levels (EU, Member States) and from the private sector (business, civic society). Missions require a managerial ecosystem to achieve the objectives through co-creation and complementary implementation by the various stakeholders throughout the process.

To reduce the tension between technocratic and democratic governance, meaningful dialogue methods must replace dated consultation methods. Real dialogue starts with common problem definition which is of as equal importance as problem-solving. Internal and external knowledge must be combined, precisely because it can upset the established internal cognitive patterns. This implies a radical change: consultation is a hierarchical, linear process; dialogue is non-hierarchical engagement with stakeholders. It has to be learned.

To properly assess paradigm shifts and to align various agendas, it is essential to involve not only stakeholders but also the centres of knowledge creation. Research has shown that there is a positive correlation between a society’s degree of tolerance for the independent, unorthodox, creative and entrepreneurial-minded and its economic success and social beneficiation. Therefore, outside-the box thinkers and critical stakeholders will have positive effects if taken seriously.

All this should lead to much improved evidence about the complexity of policy-making, delivered by a variety of stakeholders, but followed by a strictly scientific and multi-disciplinary testing. Positions not validated by scientific peer review should be resisted and not become politically validated because of electoral expediency. This requires a better use of existing own resources and of outside ones. Because the EU has moved from a relatively stable environment into a permanently evolving one, it is necessary therefore to move beyond a culture of regulation and control and towards a culture of flexible and incentive-compatible mentoring and coaching of all stakeholders, without excluding regulation when proven necessary.

This would bring real subsidiarity without reducing the growing need for efficacious collaboration, with diversity and mutuality as guiding principles. The choice of policy direction to achieve common goals can often remain at national level. EU legislation, if needed, can be restricted to framework legislation. National policy choices can be defined as matters of common concern, and efforts can be made to reach agreement on common objectives and clear benchmarks. Governments present their plans for achieving common goals and peer review their performance. Collaboration is voluntary (see also blog on Improving EU democracy and government efficiency).

These ideas may seem radical if judged in the light of more than two decades of operational stagnation in EU governance. They are timid if seen in the light of current policy-making challenges.

Stefan Schepers

Globalisation, cosmopolitanism and the immigration dilemma

by Nada Korac-Kakabadse

Democracy seems under threat from the twin forces of globalisation and immigration. However, cosmopolitanism approaches to immigration in Europe and beyond offer competing views and outcomes, and why there is an urgent need to re-evaluate immigration policy.

Historical Development

Globalisation, cosmopolitanism and immigration have a history dating back more than 1.75 million years ago with the movement of Homo erectus out of Africa and across Eurasia.

Since the emergence of the first state around 4000 Before the Common Era (BC), people continued to cross fragile boundaries and, in doing so, extended and reshaped them.

Nomads have trekked entire continents while carving out new empires and, although the environment in which immigration exists today is complex as in ancient times it still involves massive exchanges of people between their countries of origin and ultimate destinations.

Globalisation – industry, military and economic power

Globalisation is characterised by colonisation, whether this in the form of conquering new regions, cultivating lands, or establishing dominancy with products and services. Between 1600 and 1800 European empires created an early form of globalisation through their trading activities, allowing European colonisation and associated slave and plantation economies to thrive in the Americas and parts of Asia and Africa.

From the late 16th century onwards Europe’s accelerated economic and military dynamics spawned significant increases in migration, while economics and religion helped propelled missionaries and merchants across continents.

According to Linda Colley’s book ‘Captives,’ by 1800 the European powers, along with Russia and the United States, had laid claim to 35 percent of the world’s total land area, and by 1914 this figure had risen to 84 percent. Many Europeans migrated to America during the 18th and 19th centuries due to economic developments and opportunities and this flow continued into the early 20th century when the termination of slave trade paved the way to mass movement of Asian labour.

Between the 19th and mid-20th centuries a modern form of globalisation prevailed based on Western European and American industrialisation and military power. This in turn created economic interdependences, internationalisation and a need for international relations. In the process Globalisation effectively became a devastating process that propagated the Westernisation of the political order through an imported state system.

The global economic downturn of the 1930s persisted until after World War II and effected a steady but low flow of migration. After WWII globalisation continued through multinational entities such as the International Monetary Fund, World Bank, World Trade Organisation and other similar entities. This served to promote significant cultural models and processes which were imposed through various economic programmes and later extended by the Internet, global media and popular culture.

The collapse of the Soviet Union in the late 20th century created new migratory outflows. The 21st century has seen increased military activities in the Middle East which have created a new pattern of migration within Southeast Asia, the Middle East, North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa among other areas.

According to the UN Refugee Agency the current world population is estimated to be 7.6 billion. The number of forcibly displaced people worldwide at the end of 2016 stood at 68.5 million, of which approximately 25.4 million refugees have fled to another country while the rest are displaced people within their own nations. Some 57 percent of refugees worldwide come from Syria, Afghanistan and South East Sudan. Migration is widely spread now that 1 in 33 people on the planet are international migrant, while 1 in every 113 is a refugee. This migration explosion has spawned fierce debate and continues to shape numerous controversial political and policy platforms around the world. The central arguments underpinning immigration debate are human rights versus national sovereignty.

Cosmopolitanism – civility and valuing difference

Since its inception in Ancient Greece 4th century BCE, cosmopolitanism has had a rich, complex and somewhat inconstant history. It has surfaced periodically during times when societies have required rebalancing, only to submerge and then all but disappear. During the Enlightenment it re-appeared as the philosophy of universalism and perpetual peace, and has been advocated by thinkers such as Immanuel Kant and Jacques Derrida. It is viewed by many today as the antidote to globalisation.

A useful definition to consider is that Cosmopolitanism expands the scope of our ethical concerns beyond limitations set by policy makers. A cosmopolitan outlook is concerned with applying ethical principles to all parts of the planet. Although historical interactions and interdependencies have shaped the modern world, cosmopolitan thinking allows us to reflect on the ethical principles of the parochial mind-set which currently influences policy thinking.

Globalisation traditionally uses the assimilation of people and cultures and, in its current form, entrenched Anglo-American culture. This is now seen by some to have reached its peak and is on the decline.

Cosmopolitanism, on the other hand, shows greater sensitivity to value differences. It is about plurality, the acknowledgement of ‘otherness’ and a commitment to stimulating the self-reflexivity of a divergent and entangled world. Cosmopolitanism promotes and places high value on inclusivity, diversity, tolerance, respect and espouses the importance of multiple affiliations. It further calls for citizenship education in its broadest sense and the cultivation of ‘moral reciprocity’ based on shared commonality and the development of empathetic and genuinely respectful citizens.

Cosmopolitanism calls for an openness to the world and an awareness of a worldly sphere of responsibility. This is embodied by practising civility and a demonstrating commitment to dialogue and non-violence. However, despite the huge and obvious benefits to humanity, when cosmopolitan ideals meet the state’s interests under globally imposed economic pressures, cosmopolitanism values are largely cast aside.

The challenges of migration

Globalisation in the late 20th century gave tour de force to four freedoms: movement of goods, services, capital and people.

The fourth freedom, while often promised, struggles to deliver and creates fierce debate as segments of the world’s population continue to scatter across continents and disperse amongst nations. The arguments and language used in immigration debate often indicates an individual’s position on the issue, and includes terminology such as the ‘undocumented worker,’ implying productive labour without papers, or ‘illegal immigrant,’ suggesting an undesired person.

Alternatively, language can capture the reasons for leaving home in the first instance, namely involuntary and voluntary migrants. Involuntary migrants are forced to move due to circumstances beyond their control, such as being displaced by war, famine, or a well-founded fear of persecution. Voluntary or ‘economic migrants’ move as a result of their own desires and motivations to search out improved financial and social conditions.

The impact of immigration on individual nations varies depending on whether a country is a point of origin or a destination. The resulting dilemma is one of how to manage an expanding number of immigrants. With a rise in the global population the numbers of immigrants themselves are staggering. According to Eurostat (1st January, 2017) foreign citizens made up on average 7.5% of persons living in EU Member States.

Both legal and illegal immigrants have made considerable contribution to the vast exchange of currency between nations as a large percentage of immigrants send money to family members in their countries of origin.

Although the country of destination often receives extensive contributions and benefits from immigrants, they also face three moral dilemma:

Contentious immigration laws – for example, the US and Spain allow for the collection of income tax from illegal immigrants, whilst denying them full access to government services. Military service has been a means to gaining legal citizenship in countries such as US, UK and Italy. The repatriation of immigrants to high-risk environments and immigrant profiling for the purposes of risk management are equally contentious, as many immigrants arriving in Europe via the coastal routes of Spain, Italy and Greece often do so under dangerous conditions and many lose their lives during the journey.

Government strain under escalating costs – although the relationship between immigration and terrorist attacks is extremely limited, many governments feel they need to manage terrorist threats and invest heavily in border controls and costly security systems. They also feel a need to protect social welfare systems such as health, education, transportation, and unemployment insurance. For example, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Norway typically have homogenous populations who share a common history, language, religion and culture, and have traditionally offered extensive social services to support them. Large-scale immigration adds an additional burden to modern day social welfare systems, which are slowly dwindling throughout Europe

Populations feeling threatened – those in destination countries often feel uncomfortable by profound changes due to newcomers in their communities. Many feel that immigrants pose a serious threat to a country’s economy by damaging the equilibrium of the social welfare system, culture and an established way of life. In reality, labour intensive businesses such as construction, tourism, food processing, and agriculture benefit from both legal and illegal immigrants and are in largely in favour of migration.

An urgent need to re-evaluate immigration policy

Current immigration policy debates are based upon a dichotomous world-view, namely that of citizens and foreigners. This often results in a stigmatisation and even demonisation of whoever is perceived as being ‘the other.’

Rather than implementing costly and defensive measures, such as the establishment of The European Border and Coast Guard Agency (or Frontex), enhanced border surveillance, risk analysis reports on migration flows and other militarised approaches, why not consider a starkly different approach? Instead, invest in the many war torn and divested communities that require improvement and help those in most desperate need, minimising continued aggravation in the process.

Help is also desperately needed for destination countries’ local communities, particularly where residents are relatively deprived. This serves to create a localised mind-set that clings to outdated values and traditions and is easily exploitable by political movements which champion anti-migration fears.

Underinvestment nurtures a prejudiced mind-set that can thrive in deprived communities. It is a direct result of globalisation, accentuated by an economic race to the bottom. At the very least, a cosmopolitanism approach to immigrating dilemmas requires transnational accountability and respect for international law.

Throughout the centuries, Europe has often championed cosmopolitan ideals, which at the same time it has struggled to implement. The importance of a cosmopolitan education is embodied by the Continent’s Erasmus programmes, including the EuRopean Community Action Scheme for the mobility of university students. Beginning in 1987 this has enabled more than 230,000 students to study abroad each year across more than 4,000 higher education institutions in 33 countries.

The Erasmus Mundus programme for scholarships and academic co-operation between Europe and the rest of the world has been similarly successful. Established in 1990 it now operates in 27 countries with the aim of modernising higher education in EU neighbouring countries. Cosmopolitan education can also have a positive impact on immigrant teaching and learning due to its emphasis on valuing differences. This helps immigrants to view their differences as assets, rather than deficiencies.

There is an urgent need to re-evaluate immigration policy from a cosmopolitan perspective. Populations in destination countries, private enterprises, social service providers, legal and illegal immigrants – whether refugees, asylum seekers or economic – all need to be consulted in order to create more effective and humane policies. Their voices should be heard ahead of addressing the central question: ‘how do we achieve a balance between human rights and a nation’s right to sovereignty?’

Nada Korac-Kakabadse

 

 

Aligning contrasting views and interests in the EU : a triple failure

by Daniel Guéguen

In a democracy, representing interests (more commonly known as ‘lobbying’) is a complex profession founded on a simple choice: either you try to convince and build consensus via mediation, or you work to impose one side’s view upon the other. The European Union, so long a beacon of mediation, is slowly drifting towards the second option. This is a real danger!

For a long time public affairs was structured around two actors: voters and the representatives they elect. The European Economic Community, as a creator of technical regulations since its creation in 1957, added a third (Commission civil servants) and then a fourth: lobbying groups. In the Anglo-saxonised world of Brussels, lobbying groups are well-established and are always consulted by the institutions.

The system, based on decision-making processes that were on the whole simple (or at least standardised) and involved a limited number of players, functioned well up until the 2000s. At the turn of the 21st century, four factors changed the rules of the game: decision-making processes were made much more complex by the Lisbon Treaty, control over files slipped from the political to the technical level, civil society emerged and the use of social networks became widespread.

Today, five actors – a kind of pentagram – share the European power

In the EU, the Commission remains the cornerstone of decision-making (since it proposes and implements), with the co-legislators (the European Parliament and the Council) adopting laws. But clearly the lower levels of the Commission are currently more important than those residing at the upper echelons. In addition to these experts, the Commission has other experts who prepare impact assessments, conduct scientific analyses and participate in working group discussions.

The orientation is determined up high, but implementation is done at the bottom. Elected politicians are the guarantors of democracy. But what about experts and bureaucrats? Of course, they are not anti-democratic, but it is not their job to be democratic. In fact, they are ‘ademocratic’! Their job is to draw up technical regulations and they do it as best they can, but with their help, the political vision of the founding fathers and their immediate successors is slipping in the direction of a technocratic Europe.

Two actors are missing from our pentagram: NGOs – also known as ‘civil society’ – and industry. But instead of treating them as separate categories, could we not make them two branches of the same category? The simple answer is ‘no’, because their interests, methods and strategies are radically different. There was a time when NGOs were effectively non-existent in Brussels: few in number, badly organised, weak resources. Today, they dominate the EU sphere.

There is no question of criticising NGOs as organised influence groups – they are a vital component of democracy. But it must be stressed that the ‘NGO bloc’ is not monolithic. Some aspire to dialogue and discussion. Others are more radical, hostile to the capitalist logic of our societies. And some of them – the ones we hear the most – are composed of activists.

Thanks to their mastery of communication and social networks, and their belief that they speak for the public interest, it is obvious that NGOs are the ones dictating the EU agenda. By contrast, industries are on the defensive, unable or unwilling to promote their interests and persuade others.

This issue is important, because if economic and industrial sectors (chemical, plant protection, agriculture…) continue losing against Greenpeace, Pesticide Action Network or Friends of the Earth, the fear is that European R&D will be outsourced to the USA or China, and our society will go backwards technologically. People are distrustful of science, industry, professors and experts…with the risk of returning to the age of sail boats and steam engines!

From objectivity to subjectivity!

Philosophically, objectivity does not exist. But we can try to get close to it; that is the role of the legislator. The desire to be ‘objective’ is now drifting towards subjectivity because the arguments are becoming clichés. Civil servants and politicians should be ‘nuanced’ in promoting the public interest, but instead we are confronted in the daily management of public affairs lobbying with caricatured positions and ‘black-and-white’ strategies that are the very antithesis of the need for mediation. There are plenty of examples of this!

The GMO issue is instructive in the way it has been buried by the EU. The case of NBTs (New Breeding Techniques) has gone down the same road, now considered equivalent to GMOs. The EU is therefore becoming like an island, where these products are taboo while everywhere else they are being developed. Worse still, massive imports of soya meal and other feed for livestock are coming into the EU, with residues of substances that are banned here. Apart from farmers, nobody seems surprised or concerned about this.

The big NGOs are past masters in modern communication. Greenpeace produces a million signatures against glyphosate while the farming world – which is primarily affected – cannot get 50,000! NGOs have local networks (as do farmers, but they do not know how to mobilise them unless a tractor protest is organised). NGOs reign supreme on Twitter, LinkedIn and Instagram, while industry is still coming up with long and complex position papers aimed at experts – but nobody else can read them!

Nobody argues anymore, nobody seeks to persuade, nor does anybody try to build consensus. Civil society (NGOs) frames the arguments, often as caricatures. To be blunt, the bigger the caricature, the more often it succeeds. Faced with this onslaught, industry lies down, goes on the defensive and waits for something to happen, not understanding that the longer you wait, the worse things get.

From subjectivity to softness!

Glyphosate is the perfect example of poor European governance and laxity. Does it cause cancer or not? The man in the street does not have a clue, and neither do I. To reach an objective decision, the European Commission uses specialised agencies. The European Chemicals Agency and the European Food Safety Authority have both concluded glyphosate is not carcinogenic.

Two things: either the Commission trusts its agencies and moves to authorise glyphosate, or it does not trust its agencies and must abolish or reform them.

In this affair, the laxity was two-fold: the Commission did not openly support its agencies and took refuge in a kind of comfortable duplicity (“we are not ‘for’ but neither are we ‘against’”). And when the file – an implementing act subject to Member State agreement – went to appeal, the Commission – despite being authorised to adopt in the absence of a qualified majority – shirked its responsibility for the final decision, to the great satisfaction of NGOs.

It was only thanks to an unexpected reversal of policy by Germany that a qualified majority was eventually found in favour of re-authorising glyphosate for 5 years. Some months later, a European Parliament angry with this decision set up a special ‘PEST committee’ whose very name suggests the orientation of its objectives.

In a brutal, competitive and unstable world, we absolutely have to push for a return to respectful governance of all stakeholders’ interests; a return to governance that builds consensus. This is no small matter. In fact, it is vital for the future of the European Union because it is a response to Euroscepticism. Everything must be done to adjust EU decision-making procedures and make all actors more accountable: the Commission, the co-legislators, NGOs and industrial lobby groups. For the latter, most of them are fighting yesterday’s battles, and they really need to adapt their influence techniques and trade associations to the new paradigm described above. To see economic sectors on the defensive is not good for them or for us, and certainly not for the society we aspire towards.

Daniel Guéguen